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Abstract
Neural networks are known to be vulnerable to carefully
crafted adversarial examples, and these malicious samples
often transfer, i.e., they maintain their effectiveness even
against other models. With great efforts delved into the
transferability of adversarial examples, surprisingly, less
attention has been paid to its impact on real-world deep
learning deployment.
In this paper, we investigate the transferability of adver-
sarial examples across a wide range of real-world computer
vision tasks, including image classification, explicit content
detection, optical character recognition (OCR), and object
detection. It represents the cybercriminal’s situation where
an ensemble of different detection mechanisms need to be
evaded all at once.
We propose practical attack that overcomes existing at-
tacks’ limitation of requiring task-specific loss functions by
targeting on the “dispersion” of internal feature map. We
report evaluation on four different computer vision tasks
provided by Google Cloud Vision APIs to show how our
approach outperforms existing attacks by degrading perfor-
mance of multiple CV tasks by a large margin with only
modest perturbations (l∞ ≤ 16).
1. Introduction
Recent research in adversarial learning has brought the
weaknesses of deep neural networks (DNNs) to the spot-
lights of security and machine learning studies. Given a
deep learning model, it is easy to generate adversarial ex-
amples (AEs), which are close to the original but are mis-
classified by the model [9, 24]. More importantly, their ef-
fectiveness sometimes transfer, which may severely hinder
DNN based applications especially in security critical sce-
narios [16, 10, 25]. While such vulnerabilities are alarming,
little attention has been paid on the realistic threat model
of commercial or proprietary vision-based detection sys-
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Figure 1. Real-world computer vision systems deployed in safety-
and security-critical scenarios usually employ an ensemble of de-
tection mechanisms that are opaque to attackers. Cybercriminals
are required to generate adversarial examples that transfer across
tasks to maximize their chances of evading the entire detection
systems.
tems against real-world cybercriminals, which turn out to
be quite different from those intensively studied by afore-
mentioned research.
Deployment. Computer vision (CV) based detection
mechanisms have been extensively deployed in security-
critical applications such as content censorship and au-
thentication with facial biometrics, and readily available
services are provided by cloud giants through APIs (e.g.,
Google Cloud Vision [3], Amazon Rekognition [1]). The
detection systems have long been targeted by evasive at-
tacks from cybercriminals, and it has resulted in an arm race
between new attacks and more advanced defenses.
Ensemble of different detectionmechanisms. To over-
come the weakness of deep learning in individual domain,
real-world CV systems tend to employ an ensemble of dif-
ferent detection mechanisms to prevent evasions. As shown
in Fig. 1, underground businesses embed promotional con-
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tents such as URLs into porn images with sexual content
for illicit online advertising or phishing. A detection sys-
tem combines Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and
image-based explicit content detection can thus drop posted
images containing either suspicious URLs or sexual content
to mitigate evasion attacks. Similarly, a face recognition
model that is known to be fragile [22] is usually protected
by a liveness detector to defeat spoofed digital images when
deployed for authentications. Such ensemble mechanisms
are widely adopted in real-world CV deployment.
To evade detections with uncertain mechanisms, attack-
ers turn to generate adversarial examples that transfer across
CV tasks. Many adversarial techniques on enhancing trans-
ferability have been proposed [26, 25, 16, 10]. However,
most of them are designed for image classification tasks,
and rely on task-specific loss function (e.g., cross-entropy
loss), which limits their effectiveness when transferred to
other CV tasks.
In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective approach
to generate adversarial examples that transfer across a broad
class of CV tasks, including classification, object detection,
explicit content detection and OCR. Our approach called
Dispersion Reduction (DR) as shown in Fig. 2, is inspired
by the impact of “contrast” on an image’s perceptibility. As
lowering the contrast of an image would make the objects
indistinguishable, we presume that reducing the “contrast”
of internal feature map would also degrade the recogniz-
ability of the subjects in the image, and thus could evade
CV-based detections. We use dispersion as a measure of
“contrast” in feature space, which describes how scattered a
set of data is. We empirically validate the impact of disper-
sion on model predictions, and find that reducing the disper-
sion of internal feature map would largely affect the activa-
tion of subsequent layers. Based on another observation that
lower layers detect simple features [15], we hypothesis that
the low level features extracted by early convolution layers
share many similarities across CV models. Thus the distor-
tions caused by dispersion reduction in feature space, are
ideally suited to fool any CV models, whether designed for
classification, object detection, OCR, or other vision tasks.
We evaluate our proposed DR attack on both popu-
lar open source models and commercially deployed de-
tection models. The results on four Google Cloud Vi-
sion APIs: classification, object detection, SafeSearch,
and OCR (see §4) show that our attack causes larger
drops on the model performance than state-of-the-art at-
tacks ( MI-FGSM [10] and DIM [25]) by a big mar-
gin of 11% on average across different tasks. We hope
that our finding to raise alarms for real-world CV de-
ployment in security-critical applications, and our attacks
to be used as benchmarks to evaluate the robustness of
DNN-based detection mechanisms. Code is available at:
https://github.com/jiayunhan/dispersion reduction.
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Figure 2. DR attack targets on the dispersion of feature map at spe-
cific layer of feature extractors. The adversarial example generated
by minimizing dispersion at conv3.3 of VGG-16 model also dis-
torts feature space of subsequent layers (e.g., conv5.3), and its
effectiveness transfers to commercially deployed GCV APIs.
2. Background & Related Work
2.1. Transferability of Adversarial Examples
Since the seminal finding of Szegedy et al. [24], the
transferability of adversarial examples between different
models trained over same or disjoint datasets have been
discovered. Followed by Goodfellow et al. [11], this phe-
nomenon was attributed to the reason that adversarial per-
turbations is highly aligned with the weight vector of model.
More recently, Papernot et al. [21] investigated attacks
against black-box models by training substitute models.
They also demonstrated attacks against machine learning
services hosted by Amazon, and Google.
Our work differs from Papernot et al. [21] in two main
aspects. First, the GCV APIs we attack in this work is not
the same as the Cloud Prediction API [2] (now the Google
Cloud Machine Learning Service) attacked in Papernot et
al. [21]. Both systems are black-box, but the Prediction
API is intended to be trained by user’s own data, while the
GCV APIs are trained on Google’s data and are provided
”out-of-box”. Second, we study transferability over black-
box commercial models assuming no feedback on testing
samples. Our proposed DR attack do not query the sys-
tems for constructing substitute model [21, 20] nor running
score or decision based attacks [8, 12, 19, 23], and as Liu et
al. [16] demonstrated, it is more difficult to transfer adver-
sarial examples to commercial models that are trained on
large dataset, and are potentially ensemble.
2.2. Adversarial Attacks
Several methods have been proposed recently to find
AEs and improve transferability. A single-step attack,
called fast gradient sign method (FGSM) was proposed by
Goodfellow et al. [11]. In a follow up work, Kurakin et
al. [13] proposed a multi-step attack, called iterative fast
gradient sign method (I-FGSM) that iteratively searches the
loss surface. Generally iterative attack achieves higher suc-
cess rate than single-step attack in white-box setting, while
performs worse when transfer to other models [25].
Fueled by the NIPS 2017 adversary competition [14],
several adversarial techniques that enhance transferability
have been introduced, among them we given an overview
of the most notable ones.
MI-FGSM. Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign
Method (MI-FGSM) proposed by Dong et al. [10] inte-
grates momentum term into the attack process to stabilize
update directions and escape poor local maxima. The up-
date procedure is as follow:
x′t+1 = x
′
t + α · sign(gt+1)
gt+1 = µ · gt + ▽xJ(x
′
t, y)
‖ ▽xJ(x′t, y) ‖1
(1)
The strength of MI-FGSM can be controlled by the momen-
tum and the number of iterations.
DIM. Momentum Diverse Inputs Fast Gradient Sign
Method (DIM) combines momentum and input diversity
strategy to enhance transferability [25]. DIM applies im-
age transformation(T (·)) to the inputs with a probability p
at each iteration of iterative FGSM to alleviate the overfit-
ting phenomenon. The updating procedure is similar to MI-
FGSM, with the only replacement of Eq.1 by:
x′t+1 = Clip
ǫ
x{x′t + α · sign(▽xL(T (x′t+1; p), ytrue)}
(2)
where T (x′t, p) is a stochastic transformation function that
performs input diversion on input with a probability of p.
The major difference between dispersion reduction (DR)
with existing attacks is that DR doesn’t require task-specific
loss functions (e.g., cross-entropy used by the family of
FGSM attacks). It targets on the numerical property of low
level features that is task-independent, and presumably sim-
ilar across CV models. Our evaluation in §4 demonstrate
good transferability of adversarial examples generated by
DR across real-world CV tasks.
Algorithm 1 Dispersion reduction attack
Input: A classifier f , original sample x, feature map at
layer k; perturbation budget ǫ
Input: Attack iterations T , learning rate ℓ.
Output: An adversarial example x′ with ‖ x′ − x ‖
∞
6 ǫ
1: procedure DESPERSION REDUCTION
2: x′0 ← x
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: Forward x′t and obtain feature map at layer k:
Fk = f(x′t)|k (3)
5: Compute standard deviation of Fk: g(Fk)
6: Compute its gradient w.r.t the input: ▽xg(Fk)
7: Update x′t by applying Adam optimization:
x′t = x
′
t −Adam(▽xg(Fk), ℓ) (4)
8: Project x′t to the vicinity of x:
x′t = clip(x
′
t, x− ǫ, x+ ǫ) (5)
9: return x′t
3. Methodology
Existing attacks perturb input images along gradient di-
rections ▽xJ that depend on the ground-truth label y and
the definition of the task-specific loss function J , which
limits their cross-task transferability. We propose disper-
sion reduction (DR) attack that formally define the problem
of finding an AE as an optimization problem:
min
x
g(f(x′, θ))
s.t. ‖ x′ − x ‖
∞
6 ǫ
(6)
where f(·) is a DNN classifier with output of interme-
diate feature map and g(·) calculates the dispersion. Our
proposed DR attack in Algorithm 1 takes a multi-step ap-
proach that creates an adversarial example by iteratively re-
ducing the dispersion of intermediate feature map at layer
k. Dispersion describes the extent to which a distribution is
stretched or squeezed, and there can be different measures
of dispersion such as the variance, standard deviation, and
gini coefficient [18]. In this work, we choose standard de-
viation as the dispersion metric and denote it as g(·) due to
its simplicity.
Given a target feature map, DR applies Adam optimizer
to iteratively perturb image x′ along the direction of reduc-
ing standard deviation, and projects it to the vicinity of x by
clipping at x ± ǫ. Denoting the feature map at layer k as
Fk = f(x′t)|k, DR attack solves the following formula:
x′t+1 = x
′
t −▽x′g(Fk)
= x′t −
dg(t)
dt
· df(x
′
t)|k
dx′
= x′t −
t− t¯
√
N − 1 ·
√∑
i (ti − t¯)2
· df(x
′
t)|k
dx′
(7)
From Eq.7, we state that given the targeted intermedi-
ate feature map, the optimized adversarial example x′t is
achieved when all feature map elements tj ∈ t have the
same value. Table 4 compares the transferability of AEs
generate on different layers (shallow to deep) of off-the-
shelf feature extractors across different classification and
object detection models. The result on 1000 randomly cho-
sen samples from ImageNet validation set shows that tar-
geting on middle layers, i.e. conv3.3 of VGG-16 and
conv3.8.3 of Resnet-152 provides better transferability.
4. Experiments
In this section, we compare DR with state-of-the-art ad-
versarial techniques to enhance transferability on commer-
cially deployed Google Cloud Vision (GCV) tasks:
• Image Label Detection (Labels) 1 classifies image
into broad sets of categories.
• Object Detection (Objects) 2 detects multiple ob-
jects with their labels and bounding boxes in an image.
• Image Texts Recognition (Texts) 3 detects and recog-
nize text within an image, which returns their bounding
boxes and transcript texts.
• Explicit Content Detection (SafeSearch) 4 detects
explicit content such as adult or violent content within
an image, and returns the likelihood.
Datasets. We use ImageNet validation set for test-
ing Labels and Objects, and the NSFW Data
Scraper [7] and COCO-Text [4] dataset for evaluating
against SafeSearch and Texts respectively. We ran-
domly choose 100 images from each dataset for our evalu-
ation, and Fig. 3 shows sample images in our testing set.
Experiment setup. We choose normally trained VGG-
16 and Resnet-152 as our target models, from which the
AEs are generated, as Resnet-152 is commonly used byMI-
FGSM and DIM for generation [25, 10]. As DR attack tar-
gets on specific layer, we choose conv3.3 for VGG-16
and conv3.8.3 for Resnet-152 as per the profiling result
in Table 1.
1https://cloud.google.com/vision/docs/detecting-labels
2https://cloud.google.com/vision/docs/detecting-text
3https://cloud.google.com/vision/docs/detecting-safe-search
4https://cloud.google.com/vision/docs/detecting-objects
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Figure 3. Visualization of images chosen from testing set and their
corresponding AEs generated by DR. All the AEs are generated on
VGG-16 conv3.3 layer, with perturbations clipped by l∞ ≤ 16,
and they effectively fool the four GCV APIs as indicated by their
outputs.
Attack parameters. We follow the default settings
in [10] with the momentum decay factor µ = 1 when im-
plementing the MI-FGSM attack. For the DIM attack, we
set probability p = 0.5 for the stochastic transformation
function T (x; p) as used in [25], and use the same decay
factor µ = 1 and total iteration number N = 20 as in the
vanilla MI-FGSM. For our proposed DR attack, we don’t
rely on FGSM method, and instead we use Adam optimizer
(β1 = 0.98, β2 = 0.99) with learning rate 5e
−2 to reduce
the dispersion of target feature map. The maximum pertur-
bation of all attacks in the experiment are limited by clip-
ping at l∞ = 16, which is still considered less perceptible
for human observers [17].
Evaluation metrics. We perform adversarial attacks
only on single network and test them on the four black-box
GCV models. The effectiveness of attacks are measured by
the model performance under attacks. As the labels from
original datasets are different from labels used by GCV, we
use the prediction results of GCV APIs on the original data
as the ground truth, which gives a baseline performance of
100% accuracy or 100.0 mAP and AP respectively. We also
provide state-of-the-art results on each CV tasks as refer-
ences (Table 4).
Figure 3 shows example of each GCV model’s output
for original and adversarial examples. The performance of
Labels and SafeSearch are measured by the accuracy
of classifications. More specifically, we use top1 accuracy
for Labels, and use the accuracy for detecting our given
porn images as LIKELY or VERY LIKELY being adult
for SafeSearch.
The performance of Objects is given by the mean av-
erage precision (mAP) at IoU = 0.5. For Texts, we fol-
low the bi-fold evaluation method of ICDAR 2017 Chal-
Target Layer
Classification - acc. Detection - mAP(IoU=0.5)
Inception-v3 DenseNet RetinaNet YOLOv3
VGG-16
conv1.2 (shallow) 52.5% 29.3% 31.8 42.3
conv3.3 (mid) 28.7% 34.6% 18.3 33.8
conv5.1 (deep) 35.5% 44.8% 34.0 41.5
Resnet-152
conv1 (shallow) 53.7% 63.1% 28.3 57.3
conv3.8.3 (mid) 25.8% 34.7% 29.5 41.6
conv5.3.3 (deep) 28.4% 41.5% 20.5 38.5
Table 1. The performance of classification and object detection models (columns) when attacked by adversarial examples generated
on VGG-16 and Resnet-152. The profiling result suggests that AEs generated by targeting middle layers degrade performance of both
classification and detection models by a larger margin.
Model Attack
Labels Objects SafeSearch Texts
acc. mAP(IoU=0.5) acc. AP(IoU=0.5) C.R.W2
baseline (SOTA)1 82.5% 73.2 100% 69.2 76.1%
VGG-16
MI-FGSM 41% 42.6 62% 38.2 15.9%
DIM 39% 36.5 57% 29.9 16.1%
DR (Ours) 23% 32.9 35% 20.9 4.1%
Resnet-152
MI-FGSM 37% 41.0 61% 40.4 17.4%
DIM 49% 46.7 60% 34.2 15.1%
DR (Ours) 25% 33.3 31% 34.6 9.5%
1 The baseline performance of GCVmodels cannot be measured due to the mismatch between original
labels and labels used by Google. We use the GCV prediction results on original images as ground
truth, thus the baseline performance should be 100% for all accuracy and 100.0 for mAP and AP.
Here we provide state-of-the-art performance [5, 6, 4, 7] for reference.
2 Correctly recognized words (C.R.W) [4].
Table 2. The degraded performance of four Google Cloud Vision models, where we attack a single model
from the left column. Our proposed DR attack degrades the accuracy of Lables and SafeSearch to 23% and
35%, the mAP of Objects and Texts to 32.9 and 20.9, the word recognition accuracy of Texts to only 4.1%,
which outperform existing attacks.
lenge [4]. We measure text localization accuracy using av-
erage precision (AP) of bounding boxes at IoU = 0.5, and
evaluate the word recognition accuracy with correctly rec-
ognized words (C.R.W) that are case insensitive.
Results. As shown in Table 4, DR outperforms other
baseline attacks by degrading the target model performance
by a larger margin. For example, the adversarial examples
crafted by DR on VGG-16 model brings down the accu-
racy of Labels to only 23%, and SafeSearch to 35%.
Adversarial examples created with the same technique also
degrade mAP of Objects to 32.9% and AP of text local-
ization to 20.9%, and with barely 4.1% accuracy in recog-
nizing words. Strong baselines like MI-FGSM and DIM
on the other hand, only obtains 38% and 43% success rate
when attacking SafeSearch, and are less effective com-
pared with DR when attacking all other GCV models. The
results demonstrates the better cross-task transferability of
dispersion reduction attack.
When comparing the effectiveness of attacks on different
generation models, the results that DR generates adversarial
examples that transfer better across these four commercial
APIs still hold. The visualization in Fig. 3 shows that the
perturbed images with l∞ ≤ 16 well maintain their visual
similarities with original images, but fools real-world com-
puter vision systems.
5. Discussion & Conclusion
One intuition behind DR attack is that by minimizing the
dispersion of feature maps, we are making images “feature-
less”, as few features can be detected, if neuron activations
are suppressed by perturbing the input (Fig. 2). Further,
with the observation that low level features bear more sim-
ilarities across CV models, we hypothesis that DR attack
would produce transferable adversarial examples when tar-
geted on intermediate convolution layers. Evaluation on
four different CV tasks shows that this enhanced attack
greatly degrades model performance, and thus would facil-
itate evasion attacks against even an ensemble of CV-based
detection mechanisms. We hope that our proposed attack
can serve as benchmark for evaluating robustness of future
defense.
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